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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Great Western Mining & Mineral Company appeals the District Court‟s order 
granting Appellees‟ motions to dismiss for improper venue.  For the following reasons, 
we will vacate and remand to the District Court for further proceedings. 
I 
 Because we write for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and procedural 
history of this case, we summarize them only briefly. 
 In 1999, Great Western pursued a legal malpractice action against Appellees 
Brownstein Vitale & Weiss, P.C., and Brownstein & Vitale, P.C. (collectively 
Brownstein & Vitale) in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.  The parties 
agreed to submit the matter to binding arbitration before Tom Rutter (Rutter), an 
arbitrator with Appellee ADR Options, Inc. (ADR Options).  The parties‟ arbitration 
agreement stated: 
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Each party and participating attorney has disclosed any past or present 
relationship with the arbitrator, direct or indirect, whether financial, 
professional, social or any other kind.  The arbitrator has also disclosed any 
past or present relationship with any party or attorney.  It is understood that 
any doubt has been resolved in favor of disclosure. 
 
 In September 2003, Rutter entered an arbitration award in favor of Brownstein & 
Vitale.  Great Western then filed a petition to vacate the award in the Court of Common 
Pleas of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, alleging that ADR Options had undisclosed 
conflicts of interest with defense counsel for Brownstein & Vitale.  The court denied the 
petition to vacate, and Great Western appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 
which affirmed on September 22, 2005. 
While the petition to vacate was pending, Great Western filed a series of amended 
complaints in Pennsylvania state court against ADR Options, Brownstein & Vitale, and 
Rutter, alleging breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and violations of 
Pennsylvania‟s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL).  The 
Court of Common Pleas dismissed the actions, and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 
affirmed in May 2007. 
In February 2008, Great Western filed a federal action in the District of New 
Jersey, alleging that certain members of the Pennsylvania state judiciary conspired to 
issue favorable rulings in exchange for future employment at ADR Options.  The District 
Court dismissed Great Western‟s complaint for failure to state a claim on March 16, 
2009, and denied its motions for reconsideration and leave to amend.  In a precedential 
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opinion, we affirmed the District Court‟s determinations, finding that the complaint failed 
to plead facts plausibly suggesting a conspiracy.  Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox 
Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 Undeterred by defeats in both federal court and the state courts in Pennsylvania, 
Great Western sued ADR Options in New Jersey Superior Court for breach of contract, 
fraud, and violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) on account of 
alleged overbilling during the 2003 arbitration.  That case settled on September 11, 2009, 
but before it did, Great Western filed this action against ADR Options and Brownstein & 
Vitale in the District of New Jersey, alleging breach of contract, negligent 
misrepresentation, fraud, and violations of the CFA and the UTPCPL.  In its amended 
complaint, Great Western alleged that Brownstein & Vitale represented ADR Options in 
two separate actions in 1997, that it had a duty to disclose this attorney-client relationship 
pursuant to the arbitration agreement, and that its failure to do so resulted in an 
unfavorable arbitration award for Great Western.   
Appellees moved to dismiss Great Western‟s amended complaint on the basis of 
improper venue, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim for relief.  
On April 6, 2010, the District Court granted Appellees‟ motions to dismiss, finding that 
venue in the District of New Jersey was improper and that transfer to another venue 
would not be in the interest of justice.  App. at 5a (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (providing 
that when venue is improper, a district court “shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of 
  
5 
 
justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been 
brought”)).  Although the Court chose not to reach the merits, it held that “it is apparent 
that Great Western is attempting to initiate a new action that has previously been decided 
at least two or three times on the merits, involving the same parties, events, and legal 
claims.”  Id. at 6a.  In its order denying Great Western‟s motion for reconsideration, the 
District Court rejected Great Western‟s contention that “the Court has been hoodwinked 
by defendant‟s clever strategy of misrepresenting the facts,” again stating that “it is clear 
that this litigation had been previously litigated several times.”  Id. at 8a. 
Great Western filed this timely appeal, claiming the District Court erred in 
dismissing its amended complaint for improper venue.  Appellees urge us to affirm for 
numerous reasons, including:  (1) venue was improper; (2)  the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
bars jurisdiction; (3) the claims are barred by res judicata and the entire controversy 
doctrine; (4) ADR Options is immune from suit; and (5) Great Western fails to state a 
claim for relief.
 
 
II 
A 
Appellees claim we have no subject matter jurisdiction over Great Western‟s  
appeal because, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we are barred from considering a 
claim that is “inextricably intertwined” with a state court adjudication.  Exxon Mobil 
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).  We exercise de novo 
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review over questions of subject matter jurisdiction, PennMont Sec. v. Frucher, 586 F.3d 
242, 245 (3d Cir. 2009), and “have an independent obligation to determine whether 
subject-matter jurisdiction exists,” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). 
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a federal claim only if four requirements are 
satisfied: “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff „complain[s] of 
injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments‟; (3) those judgments were rendered before 
the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and 
reject the state judgments.”  Great Western, 615 F.3d at 166 (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 
U.S. at 284).  Here, Great Western does not allege that its injuries were caused by the 
state courts‟ refusal to vacate Rutter‟s arbitration award or award it monetary relief.  
Rather, the gravamen of Great Western‟s complaint is that Appellees‟ failure to disclose 
material information regarding their prior attorney-client relationship caused Great 
Western to submit to binding arbitration before an allegedly biased arbitrator.  Because 
“the injury complained of in federal court existed prior to the state-court proceedings and 
thus could not have been „caused by‟ those proceedings,” Great Western, 615 F.3d at 
167, the second and fourth requirements of Exxon Mobil have not been satisfied.  Thus, 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is no obstacle to our jurisdiction over this appeal.
1
 
                                                 
1
 Appellees assign too much weight to Exxon Mobil‟s use of the phrase “inextricably 
intertwined.”  In Great Western, we explained that the phrase “inextricably intertwined” “is 
simply a descriptive label attached to claims that meet the [four] requirements outlined in Exxon 
Mobil.”  615 F.3d at 170 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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B 
 Turning to the merits, we consider the District Court‟s finding that venue was 
improper in New Jersey.  We exercise plenary review over the District Court‟s legal 
determination, and review its decision to dismiss Great Western‟s amended complaint for 
abuse of discretion.  Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 878 (3d Cir. 1995). 
In federal diversity suits, venue is proper in any district where: (1) “any defendant 
resides, if all defendants reside in the same State;” (2) “a substantial part of the events or 
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the 
subject of the action is situated;” or (3) “any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction 
at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the action may 
otherwise be brought.”  28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).  For purposes of Section 1391(a)(1), “a 
defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which 
it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.”  Id. § 1391(c).  
Because improper venue is an affirmative defense, the burden of proving lack of proper 
venue remains—at all times—with the defendant.  Myers v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 695 F.2d 
716, 724-25 (3d Cir. 1982) (comparing jurisdictional questions “concerning the court‟s 
power to entertain the action” with “dilatory defenses [such as venue] that do not concern 
the court‟s authority to adjudicate,” and holding that while the plaintiff bears the burden 
of proving the former, defendants must plead facts showing the absence of the latter).  As 
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such, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to include allegations in his complaint showing 
that venue is proper.  Id. at 724. 
In its amended complaint, Great Western alleged that ADR Options and 
Brownstein & Vitale were corporations “doing business” in the State of New Jersey, so 
venue was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) and (c).  See Wilson v. Paradise Vill. Beach 
Resort & Spa, 395 N.J. Super. 520, 528 (App. Div. 2007) (holding that, under New 
Jersey law, any party that “maintains minimum contacts with the . . . state that are 
continuous and substantial” will be subject to personal jurisdiction).  Brownstein & 
Vitale argued in its motion to dismiss that venue was improper in New Jersey, because all 
defendants were citizens of Pennsylvania resident in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.
2
  The law firm failed to acknowledge, however, that a corporation may 
“reside” in more than one state, see 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (providing for transfer of a case 
where both the original and the requested venue are proper), and presented no evidence 
                                                 
2
 ADR Options did not raise the venue issue in its motion to dismiss and its failure 
to do so constituted a forfeiture of that right.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h); see also Myers, 
695 F.2d at 721 (“The federal rules single out four defenses which must be raised by the 
defendant‟s initial responsive pleading in order to be preserved.  Such a rule reflects a 
strong policy against tardily raising defenses that go not to the merits of the case but to 
the legal adequacy of the initial steps taken by the plaintiff in his litigation.”).  Where a 
defendant fails to timely object to venue, “it is inappropriate for the trial court to dispose 
of the case sua sponte.”  Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 19 (3d Cir. 1976).  However, 
because Brownstein & Vitale objected to venue and Great Western had adequate 
opportunity to respond, the District Court did not err in considering the issue. 
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showing that it was not subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey.
3
  28 U.S.C. § 
1391(c).  Thus, the firm failed to satisfy its burden of showing that venue was improper 
in the District of New Jersey, and the District Court erred in dismissing Great Western‟s 
amended complaint on that basis. 
C 
Appellees maintain that even if the District Court‟s venue determination is 
erroneous, we should affirm the District Court‟s order dismissing Great Western‟s 
amended complaint on alternative grounds, including claim preclusion, arbitral immunity, 
and failure to state a claim for relief.  See United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 279 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (holding that an appellate court may affirm the result reached by a district 
court on alternative grounds). 
Although these arguments may well be meritorious, because “the resolution of 
[these] issue[s] requires the exercise of discretion or fact finding,” we find that “it is 
inappropriate and unwise” to decide these matters in the first instance.  Norfolk S. Ry. Co. 
v. Basell USA Inc., 512 F.3d 86, 97 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted); see K-Land Corp. No. 28 v. Landis Sewerage Auth., 800 A.2d 861, 868 (N.J. 
2002) (recognizing that equitable considerations can relax New Jersey‟s mandatory-
                                                 
3
 Based on the limited record before us, it appears that corporate Appellee 
Brownstein & Vitale has strong ties to the District of New Jersey.  These contacts 
include: membership in the New Jersey State Bar, a substantial caseload in New Jersey 
courts, and an office in Cherry Hill, New Jersey. 
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joinder requirements when joinder would be “unfair”); Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-
12 (1991) (addressing standard for overcoming judicial immunity).  Thus, we leave it to 
the District Court on remand to evaluate the merits of Appellees‟ alternative defenses. 
For the reasons stated, we will vacate the order of the District Court and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
